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Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the undersigned 
counsel for appellee represents that the original parties to this action were the State of Utah, 
Michael James Fisk, III and Melissa Fisk. The charges against Melissa Fisk have been 
dismissed by the District Court. These parties are and have been the only parties to this 
litigation. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County (the Honorable Stephen L. Henroid). Michael James Fisk, III, the 
defendant-appellant, petitioned this Court for permission to appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(j). This Court ordered the petition granted. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the State's incompetence in 
presenting its case against Mr. Fisk at the first preliminary hearing constituted "other good 
cause" under State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) and that the State could have a 
second chance for bindover at another preliminary hearing. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to be de 
novo (as purely a question of law). "[Ajppellate review of a trial court's determination of the 
law is usually characterized by the term "correctness.1" State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994); "correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of the law." Id; see also State v. Deli. 861 
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court when Mr. Fisk filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in support pursuant to State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 
(Utah 1986) on May 28,1997. R. at 145-190. 
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2. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the State acted in good faith 
when it failed to present sufficient evidence for bindover at the first preliminary hearing. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The District Court's findings of fact regarding prosecutorial good faith are reviewed 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court in oral argument on Mr. Fisk's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. at 393), and Objection of Michael Fisk to State's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. at 318-24). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Appeal is from an Interlocutory Order entered on July 22, 1997 by the Honorable 
Stephen L. Henroid. (R. at 358-63; a true and correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
The District Court ruled that the State could proceed to a second preliminary hearing after 
charges had previously been dismissed against the defendant-appellant, Mr. Fisk, pursuant to 
State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). 
HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT 
AND OVERVIEW OF FACTS 
This matter originally came before the Third Circuit Court in 1995 after Mr. Fisk was 
charged by Information with a Single Count of Child Abuse, a Second Degree Felony. 
Michael Fisk's wife, Melissa Fisk, was also charged with Child Abuse. A preliminary hearing 
was held for both defendants on July 18, 1995. The State presented testimony from only three 
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witnesses: Helen Britton, M.D., Earl McKee, a University of Utah Police Officer, and Kim 
Beglarian, also a University of Utah Police Officer. The prosecution theory was that Mr. Fisk, 
or his wife, had intentionally and repeatedly inflicted child abuse upon D.S., a child in the care 
and custody of both defendants, and that the other defendant had knowingly permitted the 
perpetrator to inflict the injuries upon the child. The State argued that brain injury and 
numerous bruises of varying ages on D.S. proved child abuse.1 
In ordering that both Michael and Melissa Fisk be discharged and the case dismissed, 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid, sitting as a magistrate, found probable cause to believe that the 
injuries to D.S. were not caused by accidental means. However, Judge Henroid also noted, 
"what I didn't hear was any evidence connecting either of the Defendants to any of the 
injuries. So I find the State has not met its burden with respect to probable cause." R. at 7, p. 
113 (emphasis added). The State filed a Notice of Appeal, but later dismissed the appeal 
before briefing, (see Order of Dismissal, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"). 
Over one and one-half years after the dismissal, the State re-filed the case splitting the 
brain injury and the bruising evidence into a Five Count Information against the Defendants, 
Michael Fisk was charged in Count I with Child Abuse on March 19, 1995, a Second Degree 
Felony; in Count II with Child Abuse, between March 3 and 19, 1995, a Second Degree 
1
 Any person who intentionally or knowingly inflicts serious physical injury upon a child 
or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious 
physical injury upon the child is guilty of Child Abuse, a Second Degree Felony. "Serious 
physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's 
health, or which involves physical torture, or which involves a serious substantial risk of death 
to the child. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(l)(c) and (2). 
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Felony, in Count IV with Child Abuse between December of 1994 and March 19, 1995, a 
Class A Misdemeanor. Melissa Fisk was charged in Count III with Child Abuse, between 
March 3 and 19, 1995, a Second Degree Felony; and in Count V with Child Abuse between 
December of 1994 and March 19, 1995, a Class A Misdemeanor. R. at 8-12. 
Hearings were held on May 5, 1997 and June 30, 1997 in front of the Honorable 
Stephen L. Henroid to determine if the case warranted a second preliminary hearing under 
State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). R. at 95-96, 313-14. 
The State attempted to satisfy the Brickey requirement of "new or previously unavail-
able evidence" by offering the opinion of Dr. Marion Walker (R. at 164-65; a copy of Dr. 
Walker's opinion letter dated May 1, 1997, is attached hereto as Exhibit "C") and by pointing 
out testimony from the Juvenile Court2 proceeding that D.S. was fed oatmeal by Melissa Fisk 
and then left alone in the bedroom with Michael Fisk immediately before his apneic condition 
was discovered. 
Mr. Fisk asserted that the evidence being offered by the State was available at the first 
preliminary hearing so the State should be barred from refiling. R. at 145-90. 
The District Court, in its Findings of Fact (R. at 358-63; a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A"), rejected the State's position that the evidence was previously unavail-
able or new. The court found that the "prosecutor failed to discover facts which through the 
exercise of ordinary diligence could have been discovered." R. at 360, H 5. The court did not 
2
 Following the dismissal of the criminal charge, the State filed a Petition in juvenile court 
alleging that D.S. was injured while in the care and custody of Michael and Melissa Fisk. 
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find that the testimony of Dr. Marion Walker was newly discovered or previously unavailable 
evidence. 
The State offered no evidence as to why the prosecution chose not to present the 
evidence it was now emphasizing. Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence on this point, 
the court found that the prosecutor's failure to present this evidence "was done innocently and 
in good faith." R. at 360, f 6. 
Despite the finding that the evidence currently presented by the State was previously 
available, the District Court ruled that the State had met its burden under Brickev as to Count I 
because the State's "good faith failure to present discoverable evidence" constitutes "other 
good cause."3 R. at 361,1f 3-5. Counts Two and Four were dismissed with prejudice against 
Michael Fisk. All charges against Melissa Fisk were dismissed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1, The District Court erred in ruling that the State could refile charges under State 
v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). The District Court concluded that the State failed to 
produce any additional evidence that was unavailable at the preliminary hearing, but allowed 
the State to proceed because there was no evidence that the State acted in bad faith. This 
ruling violates Mr. Fisk's rights under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution as 
3
 The District Court also concluded that the testimony of Dr. Marion Walker "may amount 
to newly discovered evidence or good cause." (R. at 361; Exhibit "A" at 4,13). However, 
the District Court's legal conclusion regarding Dr. Marion Walker's testimony is completely 
inconsistent with its findings of fact and even fails to make a legal conclusion by its use of the 
word "may." The Defendant asserts that this Court should disregard this conclusion of law 
under the clearly erroneous standard. 
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construed in Brickey. 
2. The District Court's finding that the State acted in good faith is clearly 
erroneous as no credible evidence was presented on this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S INCOMPETENCE IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER 
BRICKEY TO CONSTITUTE OTHER GOOD CAUSE TO REFILE 
CHARGES THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED. 
The District Court erred in ruling that the State could present evidence against Mr. 
Fisk at another preliminary hearing pursuant to State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) 
because the State mishandled the first preliminary hearing. The State's refiling of charges 
against Mr. Fisk violates his right to due process of law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court has limited the cases in which the State can refile charges 
against a defendant when a magistrate has dismissed the charges for lack of probable cause at 
the preliminary hearing. In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the defendant was 
charged with Forcible Sexual Assault. At a first preliminary hearing, the victim testified that 
she and Brickey were talking in the kitchen when he told her she was attractive and then 
moved his hand along her leg to her genital area and also touched her breast. When the victim 
said "don't," Brickey stopped touching her but tried to kiss her. LI at 645. No other evidence 
was presented at the preliminary hearing. At the close of the case, the defendant argued that 
the State failed to establish that the defendant had acted without the victim's consent. The 
Magistrate agreed and dismissed the charge because the State had failed to establish a prima 
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facie case of forcible sexual abuse. Id 
The State then refiled the charge and at the second preliminary hearing called the 
victim and the victim's father. Although the victim's father had been present at the first 
preliminary hearing, the State had elected not to call him. At the second preliminary hearing 
the father testified that when confronted, Brickey admitted "making advances" toward the 
victim and touching her genital area and breasts. Id On appeal the Utah Supreme Court 
agreed with the defendant that the father's testimony did not constitute "new or previously 
unavailable evidence relating to the issue of consent." Id at 648. The court stated that the 
State had no new or previously unavailable evidence, and, "[ujnder these circumstances, there 
was no good cause for refiling the charge against Brickey...." Id (emphasis added). 
The factual and procedural history in Brickey is very similar to the instant case. In Mr. 
Fisk's case, the State could have consulted with Dr. Walker prior to the preliminary hearing -
his opinion is based upon the same evidence available to the State at the first preliminary 
hearing. However, the State made a tactical decision in how to present its case, and it failed to 
convince the magistrate that "the crime charge had been committed and that the defendant has 
committed i t . . . . " Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2). As in Brickey. the State's tactical decision not to 
consult Dr. Walker is insufficient to justify a second preliminary hearing. 
The holding in Brickey was revisited by the Utah Supreme Court in 1994 in State v. 
Jaeger. 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994). In Jaeger, the magistrate dismissed charges against the 
defendant for lack of probable cause at a preliminary hearing. The State appealed this 
decision. The issue presented on appeal was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to 
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hear the appeal since a magistrate's decision to bind a defendant over for trial is not an 
appealable order. Id at 54. The court held that a dismissal by the magistrate is appealable. In 
addressing the issue of refiling of charges under Brickey, the court said that the "State cannot 
refile criminal charges dismissed for lack of evidence unless it can introduce new or additional 
evidence, or demonstrate other good cause that justifies refiling." Id (citing State v. Brickey. 
714 P.2d at 647-48). This suggests an alternative basis for refiling, but the Utah courts have 
not expanded further on this issue. The Utah Supreme Court, has, however, provided a 
remedy for the State when it feels that a dismissal for lack of probable cause was made in 
error - it can appeal. The State did file an appeal, but then made another strategic decision and 
dismissed the appeal. (See Order of Dismissal, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"). 
The District Court has concluded, as a matter of law, that the State's "good faith failure 
to present discoverable evidence" constitutes "other good cause" under State v. Brickey. 714 
P.2d 644, 645 (Utah 1986). This result stretches Brickey beyond the limits of due process. 
The Brickey opinion cites an Oklahoma case, Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1971), and its holding that a prosecutor cannot refile unless they can "show that new or 
previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." 
Brickey at 647 (citing Jones v. State. 481 P.2d at 171). 
Jones was further clarified by the case of Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma 
County. 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). There, the court states that a continuance of a 
preliminary hearing may be allowed if the "prosecutor miscalculates and fails to present 
sufficient evidence" and "that the additional witnesses, or other evidence, are reasonably 
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available; and that a continuance will not be sought in order to conduct further investigation 
seeking the evidence, in a dilatory manner." Id at 897. This statement relates solely to the 
issue of a continuance of the preliminary hearing, not refiling of the charges. On the issue of 
refiling a charge, the Harper court noted, "for good cause shown, and subject to the present-
ment of new evidence, the charge may be refiled." Id. (emphasis added). This case contem-
plates a two-part analysis - with refiling being allowed only if both good cause and new 
evidence are presented by the State.4 
Other jurisdictions have explicitly limited refiling of a criminal complaint after the 
dismissal at preliminary hearing to those situations where new evidence is discovered. For 
example, in Wittke v. State ex rel. Smith. 259 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Wis. 1977), the State's 
complaint against the defendant had been fully litigated at the preliminary hearing and the 
court had dismissed the complaint for failure to show probable cause. The State attempted to 
file an additional complaint and the defendant appealed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that absent new evidence, the State was prohibited from refiling the charges, but could appeal 
the court's decision regarding probable cause. Id at 520-21. In affirming the lower court's 
order to discharge the defendant after the filing of the second criminal complaint, the court 
stated: 
The law does not favor repeated litigation of the same issue. Public policy and 
effective judicial administration require that controversies once decided on 
their merits remain in repose and that inconsistent judicial decisions not be 
made on the same set of facts. Duplicative litigation involves needless expense 
4
 Mr. Fisk has not located any Oklahoma case that has allowed the State to refile solely 
because they did not act in bad faith. 
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and disorder, and creates hardship on the individual who is twice vexed for the 
same cause." 
Id at 519. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court went on to say: M[i]f dismissal of a first complaint does 
not preclude the filing of a second, then it is difficult to see how dismissal of the second 
would preclude the filing of a third, and so on, until the repeated prosecutions reached the 
point of harassment." Id. at 520. 
In Colorado, when a complaint is dismissed after a preliminary hearing in county 
court, the prosecution may request permission from the district court to file the complaint 
there. The district court is required to balance the right of the State to prosecute against the 
rights of the accused to be free from "discrimination and oppression." Holmes v. District 
Court of Summit County. 668 P.2d 11,14 (Colo. 1983). In Holmes, the district attorney 
acknowledged that he had made a tactical decision at the first preliminary hearing to call an 
officer to testify as to what an informant said, instead of calling the informant himself. Id at 
14-15. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this as a basis for refiling. The court noted that 
allowing the district attorney to proceed "would constitute approval of the undesirable practice 
of presenting as little evidence as posible at the preliminary hearing in the county court and 
then district court consent for a direct filing if no probable cause is found by the county court." 
Id at 15. Again, as in Wittke. this court was concerned that repeated preliminary hearings tax 
the judicial system and unfairly subject the defendant to multiple prosecutions. 
In Brickey. the Utah Supreme Court specifically rejected the State's invitation to rely 
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upon a prosecutor's good faith to protect the due process rights of an accused. The court 
observed that, "the courts have had occasion to scrutinize the exercise of the broad discretion 
accorded prosecutors, and that scrutiny revealed that a prosecutor's good faith is a fragile 
protection for the accused." Id at 647. In the instant matter, the prosecutor's unexplained 
failure to present evidence at the preliminary hearing which was discoverable through the 
exercise of ordinary diligence does not constitute "other good cause." 
The State argued and the District Court concluded that "good cause" amounts to 
nothing more than an apparent absence of bad faith by the prosecutor. Under this interpreta-
tion, so long as a judge finds that the State did not act in bad faith, due process will not 
prevent the State from taking a second, third, or even a fourth try at obtaining a bind-over. 
Brickey does not absolve a prosecutor from failures of proof at a preliminary hearing. The 
conclusion of law that an absence of prosecutorial bad faith constitutes "good cause" under 
Brickey cannot be squared with the guarantee that an accused receive due process of law at the 
preliminary hearing stage of a criminal proceeding. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STATE ACTED IN 
GOOD FAITH IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AS THE STATE PRE-
SENTED NO EVIDENCE IN THAT REGARD. 
In the District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found that 
"[presentation of the evidence by the State at the July 18, 1995, was done in good faith." (R. 
at 360; Exhibit "A" at 3, f5). The court also found that "the failure to discover the evidence 
and the failure to present more compelling evidence regarding the timing of the injury and the 
exclusivity of control over the victim by Michael Fisk was done innocently and in good faith." 
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(R. at 360; Exhibit "A" at 3, f6). 
A. The Evidence Marshalled 
In support of these findings, the District Court relied upon statements made by Mr. 
Barlow on behalf of the State. Mr. Barlow stated in argument on Mr. Fisk's Motion to 
Dismiss that "I think basically it was an innocent misunderstanding and misapprehension of 
both the facts and the law and the medicine." R. at 392. He went on to say "[t]his is merely a 
miscalculation. It was a misunderstanding, and it was unfortunate." R. at 392. 
The State's submissions on this issue simply state that the case was refiled in good 
faith. R. at 271. 
B. The Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Finding that the State Acted 
in Good Faith 
The statements made by Mr. Barlow and the District Court about the prosecutor's state 
of mind at the preliminary hearing are sheer conjecture. There was no testimony offered by 
the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary hearing. Other than the statements made by 
Mr. Barlow, no evidence was presented on the state of mind or the intentions of the original 
prosecutor in this case. 
In the District Court's oral ruling on Mr. Fisk's Motion to Dismiss, the Court stated: 
Clearly, the State at the time of preliminary hearing, didn't have Dr. 
Walkers' opinion. And for whatever reason — and I think we are talking about 
competence here, frankly — the State didn't seem to know about the facts 
limiting the period of the injury from the eating of the oatmeal for a short 
period of time after that and Mr. Fisk's proximity to the child during that time 
period. In criminal cases, there are appeals raised on effectiveness of counsel 
for the Defendant. I think probably what we have here is ineffective counsel 
for the State. And I think that amounts to newly discovered evidence on the 
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part of Dr. Walker and/or its cause to a limited extent. 
(R. at 315; a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added).5 
Incompetence is not the same as good faith. 
The conclusion of the District Court that the State acted in good faith is unsupported 
by any evidence in the record. It should not simply be presumed that the State acted in good 
faith. For the State to proceed, it must bear the burden of establishing that it acted in good 
faith. The District Court erred in making a finding of fact that the prosecutor acted in good 
faith since no evidence whatsoever was presented on this issue. Thus, even if this Court were 
to conclude that prosecutorial good faith provides "other good cause" under Brickey. the State 
has not established that it acted in good faith at the first preliminary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
A prosecutor's unexplained failure to present evidence at a preliminary which was 
discoverable through the exercise of ordinary diligence does not constitute "other good cause" 
for the refiling of charges under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. Such an 
interpretation of Brickey would mean that so long as a judge made a finding that the State's 
blunder and failure to present sufficient evidence to meet the probable cause standard was not 
5
 In announcing its ruling, the District Court stated: "while this isn't addressed in Brickey. 
it probably isn't relevant for me to even consider it. And at this point and stage, it appears that 
Mr. Fisk has committed a serious crime, and that's something that you have to know weighs 
on any judge that looking at a situation like this as the Brickey analysis goes forward." R. at 
315; Exhibit "B" at p. 2 (emphasis added). Although the District Court disavowed that any 
assumptions regarding Mr. Fisk's guilt was relevant to the Brickey determination, the fact that 
this statement was made is unsettling at the least, and perhaps indicative of extraneous 
considerations influencing the District Court's deliberative process at the worst. 
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done in bad faith, due process will not preclude the State from repeating the preliminary 
hearing process until it obtains a bindover. The conclusion that an absence of bad faith 
constitutes "good cause" under Brickey cannot be reconciled with the guarantee that an 
accused receive due process of law at the preliminary hearing stage of a criminal proceeding. 
Mr. Fisk respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's ruling and order that 
the charge against Mr. Fisk be dismissed with prejudice. 
In addition, the District Court's factual finding that the State acted in good faith in the 
presentation of evidence in the preliminary hearing and in refiling charges in this case is 
unsupported by any evidence in this case and was clearly erroneous. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisV&day of March, 1998. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, m ^ 
BUGDEN, COLLINS ^MORTON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Michael James Fisk, III 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the £fl day of March, 1998,1 caused to be served two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MICHAEL JAMES 
FISK, III by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Christine Soltis s HAND DELIVERY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL j / U.S. MAIL 
160 East 300 South, Suite 600 _ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
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ADDENDUM 
Tab A 
i 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.97|01742FS 
Judge Stephen Henr^id 
A hearing on this case was held June 30, 1997. Michael Fisk was present and representee 
by Walter F. Bugden, Jr.; Melissa Fisk was present and represented by Edward K. Brass; the 
State was represented by Craig L. Barlow, Assistant Attorney General. This case was originally 
filed as a one-count information against both Defendants charging child abuse, a second-degree 
felony and alleging that on or about between March 1, 1995, and March 19, 1995, the 
Defendants, having the care and custody of Daniel Shepherd, intentionally or knowingly caused 
or permitted another to inflict serious physical injury upon said child. The preliminary hearing 
was held July 18, 1995. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the Court ruled that the 
injuries to the victim were non-accidental but that there was insufficient evidence to show that 
the defendants caused the injury and dismissed the information. At the July 18, 1995 preliminary 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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hearing, the State was represented by the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office. In 1997, the State 
of Utah, through the Utah Attorney General's Office filed a second information against these 
Defendants charging various crimes of child abuse during the same time as was alleged in the 
first information. An initial hearing was held May 5, 1997, to determine if the case warranted 
further examination by the Court under State v. Brickev. 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah, 1986). The 
parties have submitted memoranda addressing the filing of new charges. The Court has 
considered these memoranda and heard arguments from Counsel. Based on the memoranda, the 
arguments of Counsel, the Court's independent review of the record, and the Court's familiarity 
with the case, because of the first preliminary hearing, the Court enters the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. There is probable cause to believe that a child, Daniel Shepherd, was injured by non-
accidental trauma on or about March 19, 1995. 
2. Information about the injuries to the child, the timing of the injuries, and the 
exclusivity of control of Michael Fisk over the child when the injury likely occurred was 
available to the State before the preliminary hearing in July, 1995. 
3. The evidence presented by the State at the July 18, 1995, preliminary hearing was 
not sufficient to show probable cause that the injuries were committed by one of the Defendants. 
4. Information, by way of proffer, has now been presented to the Court which indicates, 
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with more precision than was offered at the preliminary hearing, the timing of the injuries to 
the victim and the exclusivity of control over the victim by Michael Fisk during the period of 
time when the injuries most likely occurred. 
5. Presentation of the evidence by the State at the July 18,1995, was done in good 
faith. However, the Court finds that the prosecutor failed to discover facts which through the 
exercise of ordinary diligence could have been discovered; failed to present critical evidence 
which could have established when the injury was inflicted and by whom the injury was 
inflicted. 
6. The Court further finds that the facts existed and were discoverable through ordinary 
diligence upon which this case could have been bound-over after the original preliminary 
hearing. However, the failure to discover the evidence and the failure to present more 
compelling evidence regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of control over the 
victim by Michael Fisk was done innocently and in good faith. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following conclusions of 
law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The State failed to present sufficient evidence at the July 18, 1995, preliminary 
hearing to show probable cause that the injury to the victim was caused by Michael Fisk. 
2. The failure to present sufficient evidence of probable cause regarding who 
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committed the crime was not done in bad faith, maliciously, or with an intent to mislead the 
Court or defense counsel. Rather, it appears and the court concludes that facts which existed at 
the time of the first preliminary hearing were discoverable in the exercise of ordinary diligence, 
but were not presented as evidence at the first preliminary 
3. The testimony of Dr. Marion Walker may amount to newly discovered evidence or 
good cause. 
4. The State's good faith failure to present discoverable evidence showing more precise 
timing of the victim's injuries and the exclusivity of control of the victim by Michael Fisk 
together with the State's current proffer regarding the timing of the injury and the exclusivity of 
control by the defendant over the victim constitutes "other good cause" as discussed in State v. 
Brickev 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah 1986). 
5. The Court concludes that Count 1 of the second information charging Michael Fisk 
with child abuse, a second degree felony, may be presented to a magistrate consistent with State 
v. Brickev 714 P.2nd 644 (Utah 1986) to determine if that charge should be bound over for trial. 
6. The additional charges of the second information, that is, Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 
encompass the same period of time as was charged in the first information. These additional 
charges could have been separated when the first information was filed and therefore, filing them 
as separate charges is prohibited by the doctrine of single criminal episode.. 
7. Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 are dismissed and the State is barred from refiling them, absent 
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an appeal by the State and reversal of this decision by the Court of Appeals. 
8. The Defendant Michael Fisk, through his counsel, may elect to have evidence in 
support of count 1 of the second information presented before this Judge or may choose to have 
another magistrate hear the additional evidence. If the Defendant elects to have another judge or 
this Judge hear additional evidence regarding count 1, the Defendant must make that election on 
the record and the Court will make a minute entry stating the election in light of State v. Brickey. 
9. This case appears to be a matter of first impression in its application of State v. 
Brickey. The interests of justice and judicial economy will be served if this matter is reviewed 
by interlocutory appeal. The Court concludes that no prejudice to either the State or the 
defendant Michael Fisk will occur if an appeal is taken to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this 2 ^ ~ day of July, 1997. 
Judge Stephen Henroid 
Approved as to form: 
Craig L. BOTOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
Attorney for Michael Fisk 
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Edward K. Brass 
Attorney for Melissa Fisk 
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4 THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
7 MICHAEL & MELISSA FISK, 
Defendants. 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 971001743 FS 
BENCH DECISION, 6-30-97 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day 
of June, 1997, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came 
on for hearing before the HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRIOD, 
District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake 
County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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For the S t a t e : CRAIG BARLOW 
Attorney at Law 
For the Defendant: CRAIG 
Attorney p||4EB 
DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
CARLTON S . WAY, CSR, RPR 
-av^ 
JUL 0 1 1997 
SA. .., «-.w wwxirtTY 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: This is a troubling case. 
3 And while this isn't addressed in Brickey, it 
4 probably isn't relevant for me to even consider it. 
5 And at this point and stage, it appears that Mr. Fisk 
6 has committed a serious crime, and that's something 
7 that you have to know weighs on any judge that's 
8 looking at a situation like this as the Brickey 
9 analysis goes forward. 
10 There is no question in my mind but that 
11 the facts existed and were discoverable upon which 
12 this case could have been bound over after the 
13 original preliminary hearing. At the same time, I 
14 don't see any bad faith on the part of the State 
15 whatsoever. 
16 What I come down to is a combination of 
17 things: One is, I don't think what the opinion 
18 writer in Brickey meant when the word "unavailable" 
19 was used is what we would normally think of as 
20 "unavailable" would mean. And as a straight matter 
21 of definition, "unavailable" would mean that the 
22 evidence couldn't have been ferreted out. I think it 
23 could have. I think what they mean is what should 
24 the State have known, what ought the State have 
25 known? 
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Clearly, the State at the time of 
preliminary hearing, didn't have Dr. Walkers1 
opinion. And for whatever reason - and I think we 
are talking about competence here, frankly - the 
State didn't seem to know about the facts limiting 
the period of the injury from the eating of the 
oatmeal for a short period of time after that and 
Mr. Fisk's proximity to the child during that time 
period. In criminal cases, there are appeals raised 
on ineffectiveness of counsel for the Defendant. I 
think probably what we have here is ineffective 
counsel for the State. And I think that amounts to 
newly discovered evidence on the part of Dr. Walker 
and/or its cause to a limited extent. 
I am going to allow this case to go 
forward on Count I in the Information against 
Mr. Fisk, only. I think all the rest of it is 
precluded by the ruling that was made in the original 
preliminary hearing. 
So that's my ruling. 
MR. BARLOW: For clarification, Your 
Honor: Do we then have a bindover or do we — 
MR.BUGDEN: Well, there can't be a 
bindover from that. 
THE COURT: You have to have another 
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1 preliminary hearing. 
2 MR. BARLOW: Okay, that's just what I 
3 was --
4 THE COURT: And I 'm not sure whether that 
5 should be in front of me at this stage or not. 
6 Clearly, this hearing had to be in front of me. And 
7 I don't know. The case was filed in Murray; wasn't 
8 it? 
9 MR. BUGDEN: I don't know. 
10 MR. BRASS: It got sent to Murray, excuse 
11 me, the way it works -
12 THE COURT: It was spun out. 
13 MR. BRASS: -geographical. 
14 THE COURT: what do you think, 
15 Mr. Barlow, where should we schedule it? 
16 MR. BARLOW: Well, I 'm certainly 
17 comfortable having it in front of you, Your Honor. I 
18 don't know that there is - I guess I am concerned 
19 that we not have a legal issue about whether you 
20 should hear it or some other judge should hear it. 
21 THE COURT: what's the Defense 
22 perspective? What is fairer to Mr. Fisk, to have 
23 another hearing in front of me when all this has 
24 already gone on or to have a fresh face? 
25 MR. BARLOW: I think that is a fair way 
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1 to approach it. 
2 MR. BUGDEN: if I can have just a day to 
3 think about it? 
4 THE COURT: Certainly. 
5 MR. BUGDEN: The other thing, Your Honor, 
6 that I contemplate doing and I'm not sure when is the 
7 appropriate time, but I am probably going to appeal 
8 your decision. 
9 THE COURT: Certainly. 
10 MR. BUGDEN: I wonder if we couldnft do 
11 an interlocutory appeal and perhaps have you sign 
12 some findings with regard to probable cause? 
13 THE COURT: I think that findings need to 
14 be prepared and I will certify it for an 
15 interlocutory appeal upon -- you've already requested 
16 it, so I'm telling you now that that's done as soon 
17 as the paperwork is ready, because I think the State 
18 would have appealed it had the ruling gone the other 
19 way. And, actually, since I went both ways, I 
20 suppose you can have appeals going both ways. 
21 Let's say a week to submit any 
22 submissions you want on how to schedule the 
23 preliminary hearing. 
24 MR. BRASS: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: And let's have simultaneous 
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1 filings. 
2 MR. BUGDEN: Actually, could we have 
3 something filed, the deadline Tuesday? I'm going to 
4 be gone all this week. 
5 THE COURT: Tomorrow, Tuesday? 
6 MR. BUGDEN: No, a week from Tuesday. 
7 THE COURT: Oh, sure. 
8 MR. BARLOW: I am going to file it by 
9 Thursday because I am leaving the country for two 
10 weeks, so... 
11 THE COURT: I will wait two weeks and 
12 I'll read whatever we've got then. 
13 MR. BUGDEN And what the State is going 
14 to submit are findings of fact and conclusions of 
15 law, that's right, and I am going to submit something 
16 with regard to the interlocutory appeal and whether 
17 or not I want a prelim in front of you or someone 
18 else? 
19 THE COURT: Right. 
20 MR. BARLOW: I can also, at least -
21 THE COURT- You can address that issue -
22 MR. BARLOW. -- address --
23 THE COURT, -please. And I think the 
24 concern is fairness to the Defendant on that. 
25 Thank you, Counsel. I think this has 
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1 been very well-briefed and very well-argued. 
2 MR. BARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: We are in recess. 
4 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 ) ss 
4 County of SALT LAKE ) 
5 
6 I, CARLTON s WAY. CSR, do hereby certify 
7 that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary 
8 Public in and for the State of Utah, 
1 
9 That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at 
10 the time and place therein named and thereafter 
11 reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided 
12 transcription (CAT) under my direction and control 
13 I further certify that I have no interest in 
14 the event of this action 
15 wrrNEss MY HAND AND SEAL this the 1st day of 
16 July, 1997 
\l ( C(LdX 
(Signature) 
19 CARLTON S WAY, CSR, RPR 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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MR. CRAIG BARLOW 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFRCE 
236 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114 
Deor Mr, Barlow: 
Re; Daniel Alex Shepherd 
As per your request. I have reviewed the medical records recording Daniel 
Shepherd, Briefly summarized. Danle! was a two year old mole who was 
brought to the Emergency Room at Primary Children's Medical Center on 
March 19. 1995 comatose from a severe head Injury. As you ore oware. there 
is a pre-existing CT scan from March 3. 1995 which does not show any 
evidence of bra«n damage. At the time he was admitted to PCMC on 
March 19.199S he had fresh bleeding over the surface of his brain and retinal 
hemorrhages seen in his eye grounds. This combination of Injuries Is highly 
indicative of o shaking Injury. 
Information from Danier* caregivers indicates that in the morning of March 19. 
199S he was notod to be awake, alert and was eating. He was noted to be 
fussy but more was no other ©vfaence of Bines*. At approximately 4:00pm on 
Morch 19. 1995 his father came from a closed room with Daniel in his arms and 
Daniel was cyanotic and not breathing. He was brought to P C M C Emergency 
Room in this condition. 
The fact that Daniel was able to be awake, alert and eating on the morning 
of March 19. 1995 Indicates that he had not yet sustained a massive brain 
Injury That is to say after the injury occurred this chHd would not have t>e^r\ 
able to be awake or conscious. The foot that he was noted to be awake and 
responsive eomer stmpiy means the injury had not yet occurred. Based on the 
Information available to me. Doniers massive brain Injury occurred after he 
was seen eating and fussing ond within hours to minutes of his cyanotic and 
opnec condition at approximately 4:00pm. 
Daniel has no other medical illness and no other injuries which would explain 
deterioration from a pre-existing condition. Even if he had prior trauma to his 
head it would not explain the magnitude of Injury that was seen at the time 
of his admission ro the hospital. His follow up MRl study November 1995 shows 
significant loss of brain substance (brain atrophy) secondary to the global Injury 
that he sustained to his brain on March 1?, 1995. 
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Re. Daniel Alex Shepherd 
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It is very unlikely ond almost impossible tor the Injuries observed on the March 
21, 1995 CT scan and November 1995 MRI study to have been sustained by 
any other mechanism other than shaking and bashing. The nature of the 
retinal hemorrhages and the location of the bleeding within and on the 
surface of his brain Is so highly consistent with shaking Injury that there is 
essentioHy no other explanation. 
I hope this Information Is helpful. Please let me know if I can provide any 
further Information to you. 
Sincerely yours, 
( i A/f'A-U tCti^J 
Marion l . Walker, M.D.. F.A.C.S.. F.A.A.P. 
Professor and Head 
Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery 
University of Utoh 
Primary Children's Medical Center 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
The State of Utah, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Michael J. Fisk and 
Melissa Fisk, 
Apellees. 
FILED 
SEP 2 1995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No 950497 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Wilkins (Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the Court upon the appellant's 
motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeal, filed September 18, 
1995. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is 
dismissed. 
Dated this^ 1 day of September, 1995. 
FOR THE LAW AND MOTION PANEL: 
s f s e l l W. Bench, Judge Ru 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of September, 1995 a 
true and correct copy of the attached ORDER was deposited in the 
United States Mail to the parties listed below: 
E. Neal Gunnarson 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Marsha S. Atkin, Esq. 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Edward K. Brass, Esq. 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr., Esq. 
4021 South 700 East, Suite #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
and a true and correct copy of the attached ORDER was deposited in 
the United States Mail to the district court judge listed below: 
Third Circuit Court 
ATTN: Appeals Clerk 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 26th day of September, 1995. 
Deputy Clerk <?^ 
Case No. 950497-CA 
